Key Highlights

• Iran's network of regional allies, long described as an axis of resistance, is diverging after each militia made a different choice about whether to join Iran's recent conflicts.

• Hizbullah has lost significant autonomy, with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps sending its own personnel to exercise direct control after the deaths of many experienced commanders.

• The Houthis have emerged as the most independent-minded ally, developing their own weapons production and forging separate ties with Russia and China.

• Iraq's government has ordered Shia militias to disarm by October, while Iran's war has caused hundreds of billions of dollars in damage to its own economy.

Divergent Paths for Iran's Allies

The more likely outcome is that Iran's various proxies survive but diverge along separate paths. Some will become tightly controlled wards, used sparingly given their diminished capabilities. Others will effectively graduate from Iranian direction entirely. Still others will emerge as strays, retaining some independence with other potential patrons to turn to. Counterintuitively, Iran appears to exercise its tightest control over the groups that have suffered the greatest capability losses.

Hizbullah illustrates this dynamic clearly. Until 2023, the group held an arsenal exceeding 100,000 rockets and missiles aimed at Israel, commanded by a leader who saw himself as a peer of Iran's Leadership rather than a subordinate. His successor, widely viewed as a less commanding figure, now presides over a group that has lost many of its most experienced commanders to Israeli strikes and faces demands from the Lebanese government to surrender its remaining arsenal. With so many senior commanders dead, Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps has sent its own personnel to Lebanon to exercise direct control, a degree of oversight the group's domestic popularity decline has done little to offset.

The Houthis Chart Their Own Course

At the opposite extreme sit the Houthis, Iran's most independent-minded ally, who began as a local insurgency in northern Yemen in the 1990s decades before receiving substantial Iranian support. That support, once it arrived, dramatically improved their capabilities, and Houthi fighters now deploy anti-ship missiles against Red Sea shipping and air defenses capable of downing American drones. The Houthis have continued guarding their autonomy closely, with their involvement in the broader regional conflict fluctuating according to their own interests rather than Tehran's direction, while increasingly producing their own weapons and forging separate relationships with Russia and China.

Iraq's Shia militias, largely a byproduct of the American-led 2003 invasion, occupy a middle position as strays whose priorities have shifted over two decades, with their primary patron now the Iraqi state itself, which employs more than 200,000 militiamen. Hamas has always been an awkward fit for a largely Shia bloc given its Sunni orientation, and fell out with Iran previously over Tehran's support for Assad's government in Syria. In March, Hamas urged Iran to halt its attacks on Gulf states, and while Iran will not abandon a group central to the regime's own identity, its support for Hamas may increasingly prove more rhetorical than material.

Limited Resources Force Difficult Choices

Even if Iran wanted to rebuild its full network of allies, its resources are constrained. The war has caused hundreds of billions of dollars in damage, American forces are blockading Iranian ports, and the collapse of Assad's government severed the land route connecting Iran to Lebanon. Some analysts see parallels to Soviet client states in the 1980s, when Moscow could no longer afford to generously support its own allies, though the comparison is imperfect since Iran's clients face a considerably messier set of alternative patrons than Soviet allies once did.

Conclusion

The fracturing of Iran's axis of resistance, from tightly managed wards like Hizbullah to increasingly independent actors like the Houthis, suggests the network's ideological branding has significantly outlived its practical function as a unified strategic asset. Whether Tehran can adapt to managing a genuinely diverse set of allies with different levels of autonomy, or whether continued economic strain forces further retrenchment, will likely determine how much strategic depth Iran retains in the region going forward.