Key Highlights

  • A new independent review found Federal Reserve staff knew or should have known about Silicon Valley Bank's vulnerabilities before its 2023 failure.
  • The bank's deposits were 94% uninsured and heavily concentrated in venture capital-backed technology companies, according to the review's findings.
  • The report was released the same week the Fed voted to raise interest rates for the first time since 2023.
  • Fed Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle Bowman has already begun a significant reduction in the size of the central bank's bank supervision division.

A More Critical Assessment of Fed Oversight

A new outside review of the Federal Reserve's oversight ahead of the 2023 collapse of Silicon Valley Bank has found that Fed staff knew, or should have known, that the bank was vulnerable prior to the crisis, according to the central bank's current vice chair for supervision. The findings were announced during a speech in London this week, delivered by the outside consulting firm that conducted the review.

Silicon Valley Bank experienced a rapid deposit run in March 2023 after disclosing it had sold securities at a $1.8 billion loss and needed to raise additional capital. The bank's substantial holdings of US Treasury securities had lost significant value following the Federal Reserve's earlier Interest Rate increases, a vulnerability the new review suggests should have been more clearly identified by Fed supervisory staff in advance.

Key Findings on Deposit Concentration

According to the review's findings, Silicon Valley Bank's deposits were 94% uninsured and heavily concentrated among venture capital-backed technology companies, a combination that left the bank particularly exposed to a rapid, coordinated Withdrawal of funds once concerns about its financial stability began to spread. Following the bank's collapse, the heads of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Treasury Department jointly announced they would guarantee all deposits at the bank, including amounts exceeding the FDIC's standard $250,000 insurance limit.

Building on an Earlier, More Measured Review

The Fed's top supervisory official at the time of the collapse had previously conducted his own review of the episode in April 2023, which found that Fed staff had been overly cautious in responding to emerging warning signs. The newer review goes considerably further, explicitly stating that supervisory staff knew or should have known about the underlying risks well before the crisis unfolded, representing a notably more critical assessment than the original 2023 findings.

The official who conducted the original 2023 review stepped down from his supervisory position in February 2025, allowing President Trump to select a new top banking regulator for the Federal Reserve. The Senate subsequently confirmed the current vice chair for supervision to Fill that role.

Political Reactions Split Along Familiar Lines

The more critical tone of the new review is likely to prompt renewed scrutiny of decisions made under the previous supervisory leadership, even though the current vice chair's public remarks did not explicitly name her predecessor. A White House spokesman was considerably more direct in his criticism, characterizing the previous regulator's earlier review as "widely regarded as politicized and self-serving" in absolving himself of responsibility for the episode.

Not all officials agree with the new review's more critical framing. The Senate Banking Committee's ranking Democratic member criticized the new review as a waste of taxpayer resources, describing it as an attempt to rewrite the historical record in a way designed to justify further deregulation that could ultimately lead to another bank failure similar to Silicon Valley Bank's collapse.

A Broader Overhaul of Bank Supervision

The Fed's current vice chair for supervision has already begun a substantial restructuring of the central bank's bank oversight practices, including plans to reduce staffing in the supervision and regulation division by approximately 30%. An internal staff directory update showed a dozen senior officials had already departed the division by early September, though the Fed has also added some new personnel and may continue hiring in certain areas going forward.

Outlook

Whether this more critical review of Fed supervisory practices leads to concrete policy changes beyond the staffing reductions already underway will likely become clearer as the broader restructuring of the bank supervision division continues. The findings may also Factor into ongoing political debates about the appropriate balance between regulatory oversight and reducing what some officials view as excessive bureaucratic burden on the banking sector.